Written by Nasser Kandil,
Between the first day of September and the tenth of it and on the eve of first day of Ashura and its last day, Hezbollah imposed new equations of strength in the balance of deterrence and in the rules of war with the occupying entity. September 1st and 9th will become turning points as the date of July 2006. The issue in its importance and morals is a matter of proving the difference between the sincere promise and the false threat, and a precise description of the status of the evil axis’ leaders led by the occupying entity and the resistance axis led by Al Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
“The target that was hit is not important”, “no human losses worth revenge” “waiting to response in time and place” and “ no one will succeed in luring us to go to war” these sentences and terms have been accompanying the Arab official discourse for many decades to evade the confrontation with the occupying entity, then in a transitional phase they became a part of the speech of the resistance axis during the transition from the passive deterrence to the positive one and through the avoidance of getting involved into a confrontation that its conditions are not guaranteed for winning. These sentences and terms become the terms of the American discourse, as in the American dealing with the dropping of its most important electronic warplanes in the world by Iran, and the dealing of the occupation army and entity with Avivim operation which violated such an important red line as the sanctity of approaching the borders of occupied Palestine in 1948. Now, once again these words are repeated after the dropping of the first drone of the enemy that violated the Lebanese airspace by the resistance.
The difference between the rules of engagement, the rules of war, and the deterrence equations is big. The rules of war impose on one team the ability to launch a war, while they impose on the other team the ability of predicting the consequences due to the ability of deterrence; the rules of engagement draw the limits of the military action and its reaction under the rules of war and the equations of deterrence. Therefore, the initiative depends on who is going to launch a war, while the response depends on who is capable to draw the limits of war by the ability of deterrence. This was the situation before the first of September. The occupying entity had the ability to launch a war, while the resistance had the ability of deterrence that makes it think well before getting involved. In other words, the occupation army was attacking without provoking the ability of deterrence, and the resistance was responding without provoking the ability of the occupation entity of going to war.
Since September 1st the resistance has transcended the limits of the previous equations, it hit in a way that provokes the enemy to launch a war, but it did not respond, it repeated that once again but it did not respond. According to the occupation entity the borders of Palestine 48 and the air defense network are the most important red lines, and the underestimation of the magnitude of the resistance’s actions is an announcement of the acceptance of the fall of entity’s red lines. The occupation entity is no longer has the ability to launch a war and thus the rules of the equation have changed. The rules of engagement have become under the control of the resistance, it uses them to fix its accumulative red lines, starting from considering its presence in Syria a red line and the Lebanese airspace a red line, and the rest comes successively. The occupying entity will successively refrain from provoking what is beyond the ability of deterrence, which is the initiative to draw red lines. Therefore, we are in front of a new mobile strategic balance depends on the equation of the positive deterrence and the announcement of the end of the passive mobile deterrence phase spread between 1996, April Understanding 2006, and the War of July.
Translated by LinaShehadeh,